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RESUMEN
El presente artículo pretende analizar, desde una perspectiva institucional/es-
tructural, cómo el diseño institucional de las agencias reguladoras, en particular, 
aquellas relacionadas con la promoción de la competencia económica, es capaz de 
hacer frente a las prácticas democráticas como la rendición de cuentas, la transpa-
rencia y el potencial riesgo de la falta de coordinación dentro del sector público. 
El artículo está delimitado al estudio del diseño institucional de las agencias regu-
ladoras a cargo de la regulación y competencia económica del sector financiero, 
analizando las agencias reguladoras en México, Brasil y Noruega. El autor explora 
cómo el diseño institucional de dichos organismos reguladores afecta la tensión 
entre autonomía y control, así como el potencial conflicto entre rendición de 
cuentas y transparencia, por un lado, y eficiencia y eficacia, por el otro.
Palabras clave: Estado regulador, Agencias reguladoras, Diseño institucional, Sec-
tor de la competencia.
ABSTRACT
Drawing from and institutional/structural perspective, the article intends to analyze 
how the institutional design of regulatory agencies, and more specifically those re-
lated to foster economic competence, is able to deal with democratic practices like 
accountability, transparency and the potential risk of lack of coordination within 
the public sector. The article is delimited to the study of the institutional design of 
the regulatory agencies in charge of economic competence and regulation of the 
financial sector by analyzing regulatory agencies in Mexico, Brazil and Norway. 
The author explores how the institutional design of such regulatory bodies have an 
impact on the tension between autonomy and control and the potential conflict 
between accountability and transparency versus efficiency and effectiveness. 
Keywords: Regulatory state, Regulatory agencies, Institutional design, Competi-
tion sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Whilst there has been much research and interest on NPM and Post-NPM re-
forms, studies show that far from being a homogeneous movement, NPM has 
been evolved as a collection of managerial and economic techniques with di-
vergent outcomes and significant variations (Kettl 2000), even within the same 
countries  and  similar  administrative-political  traditions.  Neo-managerialism 
has been unfolded in a set of different dimensions like the creation of markets 
and quasi-markets, and therefore the establishment of a collection of indepen-
dent regulatory agencies (IRAS) to regulate competence and the financial sector. 
However, unlike regulatory orthodoxy that stresses more autonomy for the pu-
blic agencies and less regulation in economic sectors, the case of the regulatory 
reforms and the creation of IRAS show that such reforms have been subject to a 
certain kind of adaptability processes, which in certain cases paradoxically drives 
to more regulation, less independence, and problems in terms of transparency 
and accountability. The above lead to consider a set of questions, like how similar 
the independent regulatory agencies are in terms of their institutional design and 
its implications; in other words, how different historical-institutional contexts 
of the States and regulatory agencies have influenced the development of IRAS. 
Drawing from and institutional/structural perspective, this article intends to 
analyze how the institutional design of regulatory agencies, and more specifically 
those related to foster economic competence are able to deal with democratic 
practices like accountability, transparency and the potential risk of lack of co-
ordination within the public sector. The article is delimited to the study of the 
institutional design of the regulatory agencies in charge of economic competence 
and regulation of the financial sector by analyzing regulatory agencies in Mexico, 
Brazil and Norway; in particular we will explore how the institutional design of 
such regulatory bodies have an impact on the following dimensions: (1) the ten-
sion between autonomy and control, (2) the potential conflict between accoun-
tability and transparency versus efficiency and effectiveness. 
In this sense, the article seeks to provide insights about transparency, accoun-
tability, new forms of regulation. At a theoretical level, the central argument is 
that the continuous interactions between the institutional context, the institu-
tional design and the structural-organizational characteristics of these regulatory 
organizations could have an effect on the possible areas of tension when mana-
gement reforms are implemented. Accordingly, the dilemma that I will explore 
in Mexico, Norway and Brazil consists on how to establish and design regulatory 
agencies that need sufficient autonomy and flexibility to perform their functions, 
but at the same time to develop institutional mechanisms that promote accoun-
tability for the citizens and for the regulated sectors. Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
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The order of the article is structured in the following way. First I point out 
a brief discussion about regulation and development of regulatory agencies. Af-
terwards, I spell out the main ideas of the approach regarding the institutional/
organizational perspective; in particular I focus on the relevance of the institutio-
nal design and its implications in terms of transparency and accountability. Then, 
I review the case studies, –Brazil, Mexico and Norway–, with special attention to 
their institutional design. Finally, I will draw some general considerations. Me-
thodologically speaking the article derives from a broader investigation program 
in regulation and IRAS, which involves revision of public documents from the 
central and federal government, papers from International organizations, inter-
views to public servants (Mexico) and academics (Brazil and Norway), as well as 
an extensive analysis of the legal framework under which the competition agen-
cies operate. 
REGULATION AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
Regulation is essentially understood as a broad concept that entails several me-
anings and has been transformed over the time. One approach conceives regula-
tion as a set of authority instruments such as norms, rules and semi-autonomous 
public agencies, a second way refers to any kind of governmental intervention 
into the economy and private sphere through public property, and a third man-
ner relates regulation to any form of state and non-state involvement as a form of 
social control (Christensen and Lægreid 2005, Greeve 2008, Baldwin and Cave 
1999). Even though there is a variety of meanings, the institutional perspec-
tive emphasizes the role of the institutional arrangements; for instance for the 
new institutionalism in economics, regulation occurs within an institutional fra-
mework and regulatory agencies become a mean through which market failures 
and problems of information can be solved; meanwhile, from a more sociological 
approach , the phenomena of regulation is best explained in terms of the political 
structure and organizational design of the independent agencies, either through 
some kind of isomorphism or as a product of historical processes (Baldwin and 
Cave 1999, March and Olsen 1983, Hall and Taylor 1996). 
The phenomena of regulation is part also of a wider movement such as NPM; 
in so far, administrative reforms have encouraged the creation of markets and 
quasi-markets in sectors that usually belonged to the public sector, in consequen-
ce such reforms have established a collection of semi-autonomous organizations 
aimed at regulating the functioning of the created markets. In this regard, the 
regulatory reform has been characterized mainly by a new way of formulating 
norms and rules to regulate the markets and quasi-markets created as a result 
of NPM reforms, as well as the establishment of semi-independent organisms 
that regulate the behaviour of the actors in certain sectors of the economy. Whe-
ther  NPM  transformations  tend  to  delegate  more  authority  to  decentralised Culebro
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departments or to strengthen the control exercised by the Ministries (Flinders 
and Buller 2006), regulatory reforms imply the development of new types of 
institutions and innovative organisational designs to standardise the interactions 
between citizens and the State. As OECD points out: 
Agencies represent a decentralised mode of government, with a new 
organisational form, which was associated with the New Public Ma-
nagement (NPM). Whereas traditional agencies still report to the exe-
cutive, even if they are granted significant operational and budgetary 
autonomy, independent regulators are often designed in a way that 
ensures a significant independence. (OECD 2005b: 72).
Regulatory agencies are associated with the development of NPM movement 
and their design symbolise a new mode of government by means of delegation 
of powers, in which a principal/agent relationship is established to fulfil specific 
tasks. Regulation, therefore is conceived as a new form of regulatory capitalism 
that encompasses new forms of relation between state and society, changes in the 
roles of politicians and expert in developing public policy, innovative forms of 
regulation like the self-regulation or the growing responsibility of networks of 
experts (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004).
Although there is a wide variety of regulatory agencies and a greater divergen-
ce has been recognised in the adoption of regulatory reforms (Bouckaert et. al. 
2006, Gilardi, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2006), in ample terms, these hybrid orga-
nisations have been described as:
(…) non-departmental organisms, formally separated from the mi-
nistry, which carry out public tasks at a national level on a permanent 
basis, are staffed by public servants, are financed mainly by the state 
budget, subject to public legal procedures and created with a single 
purpose (Christensen and Lægreid 2005: 45). 
In this regard, these organisations posses at least three characteristics: (1) de-
politicisation, (2) a certain degree of autonomy, (3) decision-making processes 
based on expertise and knowledge. 
Depoliticisation has been one of the main arguments not only for the creation 
of the regulatory agencies, but also to explain the process of agencification of the 
public sector in such a way produces disaggregation of administrative structures 
(Flinders and Buller 2006) the idea behind is that agencies insulated from any 
kind of control from politicians would have better performance than those under 
the influence either politicians or interest groups. Although the term depolitici-Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
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sation may consider a broad range of definitions, there are certain characteristics 
that avoid overlapping with other concepts such as independence or autonomy; 
these features can be summarised as the mechanisms of institutional transfor-
mation through which politicians and other groups are moved away directly or 
indirectly from any decision or policy field that is considered as desirable (See 
Flinders and Buller 2006, Christensen and Lægreid 2005) and essential for credi-
bility of regulatory policies (Majone 2005). 
During the last decades one of the most important key features of the gover-
nance systems relates to the degree of autonomy that regulatory agencies should 
posses,. However, there is also a recognised distinction between formal autonomy 
and autonomy in practice or de facto; this implies that autonomy becomes a 
multidimensional concept (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005) and may vary 
not only over time, but also among similar agencies with the same institutional 
design. Thus, the degree of autonomy may be seen in relation with the type of 
operations and the nature of the control with the higher bodies in the public 
sector structure. 
Thus, despite of the fact that autonomy may cover a wide range of elements, 
it can be unfolded in two categories: formal or legal autonomy and informal au-
tonomy. The first one relates to the institutional design of the regulatory agencies, 
and the second one is linked to the daily operations and cultural values of such 
agency. For instance, it is likely to find agencies with a high degree of legal auto-
nomy, but in practice are largely influenced by politicians and private actors from 
the regulated sector. Thus, under these two dimensions it is possible to observe 
different forms of autonomy depending on whether the level of the decision is 
either strategic or operational, such as budget and personal management auto-
nomy, policy autonomy and operational decisions (Verschuere et. al. 2006). 
 Another source of legitimacy and credibility has been the capacity of the 
regulatory agencies to carry out their own decisions based on the expertise and 
knowledge of the regulated sector; this implies, on the one hand an increase in 
the horizontal specialization of the personnel, and in the other, the development 
of some sort of transnational networks of knowledge with the purpose of buil-
ding some kind of epistemic communities, and in terms of their organisational 
structure, a higher degree of complexity not only in their tasks, but also in the 
internal procedures. Nevertheless, according to Baldwin (2005: 90) regulatory 
agencies may achieve legitimacy through five sources: (1) first, on the basis of a 
legal mandate derived from a democratic system, (2) second, on the basis of the 
perceived agreement of the people, (3) third, in the use of procedures considered 
as fair, (4) fourth, via the trust placed on the experts, and (5) finally when a deci-
sion is considered as efficient. 
 Culebro
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THE INSTITUTIONAL-ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH
The point of departure of a structural/organizational approach is the belief in 
the possibility of designing organizations with the purpose of reaching certain 
objectives based upon the manipulation of several parameters, and emphasises 
the formal design of the agencies. Thus, the designers, or reformers, try to settle 
down those structural adjustments that would allow that the organization works 
in a better way, and thus to obtain suitable measures of efficiency and effective-
ness. Nevertheless, this perspective supposes, on the one hand, a high degree of 
malleability in the structural design of the organization and on the other, a high 
level of certainty in the definition of objectives and goals of the agency (Chris-
tensen et. al. 2007).
In the case of the regulatory agencies, this approach emphasises the manner 
in which the public sector is formally organised, which implies to focus the at-
tention on the degree of centralisation/decentralisation in terms of their forms 
of affiliation with the Secretariat of the sector, for example whether the agency is 
decentralised or deconcentrated, or if the agency fails have been designed at a (1) 
Ministerial department, (2) Ministerial agency, (3) independent advisory board, 
(4) independent regulatory authority, as well as the governance mechanisms, such 
as the composition and appointment of the board, and the degree of complexi-
ty of the agency. In this regard, it is feasible to suggest that a potential tension 
between autonomy and independence on the one hand and transparency and 
accountability on the other, is reflected on the institutional design of the regula-
tory agency in terms of degree of (1) centralisation/decentralisation with respect 
to the principal, (2) type of organization (3) the governance mechanisms, and (3) 
degree of complexity. In this manner, autonomy is seen as the level of discretion 
of the regulatory authorities, while control concerns the structural constraints 
through which Ministries or Secretariats influence the decision-making process 
or competencies of these agencies.
Under this perspective, all the procedurals to enhance proper institutional 
mechanisms accountability and transparency are strongly influenced by the for-
mal structure of the agency and have become a multidimensional concept. Ac-
countability refers not only to the obligation to explain and justify their deci-
sions, as well as to provide answers and to inform the use of public resources and 
their implications, but also to establish some kind of responsibility or liability 
for their performance. This implies to know who is accountable and to whom; 
in other words, which type of relationships and formal obligations exist towards 
other powers of the State. Transparency, on the other hand, generally refers to 
those institutional mechanisms that encourage the extent to which decisions, 
resolutions and the use of resources are transparent and available to the citizens 
(Schedler et. al. 1999).Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
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Table 1: Institutional design and autonomy
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 2: Accountability and transparency mechanisms
Source: Own elaboration.
THE BRAZILIAN COMMISION OF COMPETENCE
General BackGround
The case of Brazil tends to be similar to many other Latin American countries, 
including Mexico. To a certain extent, competition policy has been a major con-
cern during several decades. For instance, from 1945, the Brazilian Government 
has implemented various laws aimed at protecting and promoting a healthy com-
petition policy and in 1962 actually established its own public entity responsible 
for monitoring the proper functioning of markets and to prevent anticompetitive 
practices. However, it was not until 1994 when the system of promotion and 
defense of competition was transformed. These changes took place in the middle 
of a series of transformations in the State, primarily involving the privatization of 
public enterprises, reduction of bureaucratic apparatus and the introduction of 
programs and plans consistent with the so-called new public management, and 
Variable Characteristics
Type of organization (1) Ministerial department
(2) Ministerial agency
(3) Independent advisory board
(4) Independent regulatory authority
Governance mechanisms Board of commissioners (collegiate)
General Director (top down)
Composition of the board Members from Public sector
Members from Public/private sector
Members from Private sector
Dimensions of autonomy Legal 
Financial
Human resources
Administrative
Political
Variable Characteristics
Accountability Obligation  to  explain  and  justify  their 
decisions, inform the use of public re-
sources responsibility or liability 
Transparency Availability of information.Culebro
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on the other hand, the liberalization of trade that brought as a result more foreign 
investment and the introduction of companies in the Brazilian market (OECD 
2000a, 2001a, 2003a).
From 1962 until 1994, the promotion of competition in the Brazilian system 
was responsibility of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), 
whose performance was primarily related to direct intervention on the market in 
order to protect the so-called “popular economy”; this in turn, consisted mainly 
on establishing a set of prohibitions related to speculation and predatory pricing 
for products, as well as price controls. In 1994 a new competition act was pro-
mulgated which gave more powers to CADE and reformed the system of pro-
moting competition (OECD 2000a, 2001a, 2003a). It is important to mention 
that by means of this law, CADE obtained a higher degree of autonomy from 
the federal/central administration, for example the fact that its board members 
could stay in office for a fixed term which could be renewed once (OECD2003a, 
2005a, 2005b). In addition, in 1995 the Congress approved changes in the Cons-
titution of Brazil, through which it allowed the participation of private capital in 
areas where the State had control, such as telecommunications, electricity and oil.
 In this way competition in Brazil system consists of three main public enti-
ties: the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE) attached to the Ministry 
of Finance, the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE) linked to the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Administrative Council for Economic Defense, (CADE) as an in-
dependent regulatory agency. The SDE is responsible for monitoring markets and 
investigate antitrust issues; the SEAE has a minor role dedicated to the issuance of 
opinions in cases of mergers and existence of anti-monopolist practices, while the 
CADE is the agency responsible for implementing competition law and impose 
fines and penalties (Brazilian legislation). 
InstItutIonal desIGn
According to the law of Brazil, CADE is a public agency linked to the Ministry 
of Justice, whose purpose is to control and prevent any kind of economic abuse, 
either with a preventive or repressive nature. The first one is developed through 
the analysis and studies related to the possible existence of anticompetitive practi-
ces and concentrations, while the second makes it through the imposition of fines 
and penalties to economic agents who commit a crime or offence related to eco-
nomic competition. Another feature is the educational, which involves the diffu-
sion of competition culture, dissemination programs in universities or research 
centres, or from the organization of seminars and conferences. As we have seen 
previously, the CADE is part of a system of different Ministries related to econo-
mic development, and sometimes also involving other agencies such as the Na-
tional Agency for Telecommunications (ANATEL) (see OECD 2005a, 2005b)Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
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As regards the institutional mechanisms of decision and Governance, the hig-
hest organ of the CADE is the plenary, composed of a Chairman and six Com-
missioners appointed by the President of the Republic and must be approved by 
the federal Senate. The term of their responsibility is two years with the possibi-
lity of renewal once more. The independence of these counsellors is guaranteed 
not only because the impossibility of its removal, since they can only be removed 
by special offences, but also because they have to work full-time to CADE. The 
same applies to the General Attorney, who is also essential in the composition of 
the CADE structure.
In terms of transparency and accountability, the CADE has a web page to 
spread resolutions and cases carried out, and have a link on the federal gover-
nment transparency. On the other hand, the plenary through its President is 
obliged to submit an annual activity report. Finally, unlike other competition 
agencies, the CADE incorporates educational function as a way to comply with 
the mechanisms of accountability and transparency (Brazilian legislation). 
THE MEXICAN COMPETITION AGENCY
General BackGround
The policy of competition has not been a new problem, actually it exists since 
1857 when the Liberal Constitution was issued; and later the current constitu-
tion published in 1917 adopted the importance of developing a healthy compe-
tition and prohibited the existence of monopolistic practices (art. 28). From the 
1990’s, the Mexican government was committed to implement a more compre-
hensive competition program, but it was difficult because the lack of experience 
in the field mined the protection and vulnerability of national companies (Avalos 
2006). 
However, in spite of these difficulties, the Federal Law of Economic Compe-
tence was issued on December 24, 1992 and the Federal Commission of Compe-
tence was established as a de-concentrated agency from the Ministry of Economy 
with technical and operational autonomy. Since then, the Commission has been 
in charge of implementing the Federal Competition Act aimed at protecting: “the 
process of competition and free access to markets, through the prevention and 
elimination of monopolistic practices and other restrictions to market efficiency, 
in order to contribute to societal welfare”. The legal nature of the commission is 
similar to other regulatory agencies like the Energy Regulatory Commission and 
the Federal Commission of Telecommunications attached to a different Ministry. Culebro
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Table 3: De-concentrated agencies of the Ministry of Economy
Source: Own elaboration.
InstItutIonal desIGn
In order to fulfil this objective, CFC is entitled to regulate concentrations and 
anticompetitive practices (both absolute and relative); it is for example entitled: 
(…) to approve mergers and acquisitions, to investigate and to impo-
se penalties for monopolistic behaviours, to authorize firms that wish 
to participate in privatizations and public tenders for the granting of 
concessions and permits in regulated sectors, and to foster the compe-
tition activities. 
In terms of regulated sectors, the CFC has the authority to regulate all econo-
mic agents whether individuals or corporations, agencies or entities of the fede-
ral, state or local administration, private associations, professional groups, trusts 
or any other form of participation in economic activities. However, similar to 
other deconcentrated agencies, the annual budget is approved by the Secretary of 
Treasury, and the surveillance and control is in charge of an internal comptroller 
headed by a public servant appointed by the Ministry of Public Function.
In accordance with their annual reports and legislation, the commission has 
the following competences: (i) Investigation: to perform the necessary inquiries 
to the economic agents involved in some kind of legal prosecution; (ii) resolu-
tion: to impose fines and sanctions and; (iii) collaboration: to establish national 
and international agreements to combat and to prevent prohibited practices.
On the other hand, an element that is different to other commissions, is that 
in the case of CFCs, the institutional framework has granted the Commission an 
institutional capacity not only to regulate and promote competition, but also to 
impose sanctions and administrative fines; for instance, it is entitled to suspend 
or eliminate concentration practices, to order the partial or total deconcentration, 
to fine up for having falsely declared or submitted false information, for having 
incurred in monopolistic practices or concentrations. 
Regulatory Agency Name Object
CFC Federal Commission of Competition  Economic Competition
COFEMER Federal Commission of Regulatory Im-
provement
Regulatory  Improve-
ment.
CGPNAES General Coordination for the National 
Program to Support Small Companies. 
Support Small Enterpri-
ses.Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
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As many other public organizations in the federal public administration, the or-
ganizational structure of the commission tends to be hierarchical with a high level of 
rigidity. This structure has four main components, (1) the Board of Government, (2) 
the Presidency, (3) the Executive Secretary, and (4) the General Offices. The most 
important decisions of the CFC as well as its governance remains in the Board of 
government comprised of one chairman and four commissioners, appointed by the 
Executive Branch for a 10-year non-renewable term, , and can only be removed for 
serious reasons. Decisions are reached by majority vote of the Board of Government. 
This form of appointment and formal independence has several implications; on the 
one hand, it allows the commissioners to be more independent and autonomous 
in their performing, it tries to avoid the agency to political times, and it becomes a 
mechanism of insulation and depolitization of its activities and, on the other hand, 
the commission is not responsible before the attached Secretary of Economy. Never-
theless, the annual budget is tied to the Ministry of Finance and Legislative Branch. 
The Chairman acts as the representative of the Commission and conducts 
the plenum of the board, and has the obligation to presents the annual reports. 
In terms of the organization of the agency, the chairman has the authority to 
appoint and remove personnel, to implement the policies issued by the Board; 
decisions of the Board are reached by majority, but the Chairman shall have the 
casting vote. Meanwhile, the Executive Secretary is responsible for the adminis-
trative and operational issues and certify the Board decisions. Finally, the General 
Office is responsible of specialized areas: legal affairs, economic studies, concen-
trations, investigations, privatizations, regional operations, international affairs, 
administration and public information
accountaBIlIty and transparency MechanIsMs
Accountability and transparency have been a common concern in the functio-
ning of regulatory agencies. In the case of the Mexican agency, there are various 
instruments to promote transparency; the most important mechanism refers to 
the Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Public Government Information; 
in accordance with this act, all public entities are compelled to establish a special 
unit to provide public information to citizens and establishes procedures to re-
quest information from governmental public agencies such as the Competition 
Agency. However, the Act also points out some limitations to the obligation to 
supply data, such as the prohibition to disclose information related to current in-
vestigations. In addition, there have been several cases in which the Commission 
has refused to deliver specific information to the Federal Institute for Access to 
Public Information based on the legal framework. 
Furthermore, even though the legislative framework establishes some criteria 
to evaluate anticompetitive practices, the Commission does not publish any in-Culebro
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formation related to these practices but only its final resolutions; in addition, the-
re is no competence law which requires the Agency to report. Other transparency 
instruments are found in the diffusion of information through its web-site, such 
as some of the resolutions of the Board of Government, legislation, programs etc. 
In the same manner as transparency, accountability is also reflected upon the 
institutional framework and is characterized by the absence of clear mechanisms 
that guarantee horizontal and vertical accountability, which makes the agency 
vulnerable to the capture of the regulated sectors. According with the legislation, 
perhaps the only instrument of accountability consists on the obligation of the 
Chairman to issue the annual reports in which the president explains some of the 
most outstanding cases solved during the year. Although the agency possesses an 
internal comptroller, it lacks effective accountability with other actors such as the 
Congress, consumers and the judiciary, as well as public participation and public 
consultations. 
THE NORWEIGIAN COMPETITION AGENCY
General BackGround
The competition policy in Norway has some features that make it different from 
other countries, even from those that share similar traditions such as the Nordic 
Nations. Norway has been characterized as a country which has a strong tradi-
tion of social welfare, where the Government has had a leading role in the deve-
lopment of the economy and social aspects. For instance, a number of markets 
in Norway are characterized by historically established and natural monopolies 
(OECD 2000b, 2001b, 2003b). Another interesting element is its degree of inte-
gration with the European Community and the network of Nordic Competition; 
in fact, many of its policies and transformations have been the result of com-
mitments to international agencies. For example, by 1998, three out of four Nor-
dic neighbours have become members of the European Union and have adop-
ted new competition laws adapted to European competition law (OECD1998, 
2000b, 2001b).
As in the case of Mexico and Brazil, the policy of promoting competition has 
not been a recent issue. The first law on competition in Norway was adopted just 
a few years from its independence from Sweden in l926, but it was until 1993 
when the Norwegian Comptition Authority (NCA) was created as the public 
agency responsible for implementing the new competition act, aimed at promote 
a healthy competition. This law worked for over 10 years until 2004, when the 
new legal system came into force. However, during these years of competition 
policy and the same authority suffered some adjustments. For example, for 2001 
a new centre-right government initiated a 5-point program to strengthen compe-
tition policy. These points were:Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
Revista de Gestión Pública 49 Volumen I, Número 1
 1. To place greater emphasis on competition policy and strengthen the    
  Norwegian Competition Authority
2. To review public regulations and institutions that may restrict competition
3. To ensure that government/public procurement initiatives enhance    
  competition and access to the market
4. To ensure that privatization of public companies does not contribute to  
  restricting competition or to the formation of monopolies
5. To ensure that the public sector is organized and run in a manner that  
  promotes competition (OECD 2003b, 2004)
 
Finally, in year 2003 a Committee was established to review competition po-
licy and the functioning of the NCA in proposing a new law which was passed 
by the Parliament in 2004. By means of this law, NCA acquired more powers to 
investigate and strengthen the institutional capacity; yet, one of the most impor-
tant elements in the new law was the change of its purpose: under the previous 
law, the purpose was the efficient allocation of resources to provide the necessary 
conditions for competition, while under the new law, the main objective is to 
promote competition as a means to achieve the well-being of society (OECD 
2002b). 
 
Until today the NCA has had two important changes: the first one, in 2001, 
when the NCA was established as a central unit based in Oslo and closed its 
regional offices because of budget reductions and the need for a greater centra-
lization of activities; the next change occurred in 2003, when the headquarters 
of the NCA were transferred to the city of Bergen where its current changes 
started (OECD 2003b). The reasons for this change were a set of presumptions 
of the parliament that NCA should operate efficiently during the relocation 
period and that a new, efficient organization should be systematically built up 
(OECD2003b).
InstItutIonal desIGn
In accordance to the Norwegian law of competition, the system of promoting 
competition is composed by the King, the Ministry, and the Competition Au-
thority. By this law, the NCA obtained a higher degree of independence from the 
central administration although it is still linked to the Ministry of Government 
and Administrative Reform. However, it becomes able to carry out its own re-
solutions without any intervention from that Ministry. The NCA also acquired 
more faculties to prevent monopoly practices and to monitor competition in 
different markets, which include to ensure adherence to the prohibitions and 
norms derived from the competition Act, as well as to intervene against concen-
trations, and to implement measures to promote market transparency.Culebro
50 Revista de Gestión Pública Volumen I, Número 1
Under the new Act, the NCA obtained more independence from the govern-
ment; however, the Minister has the power to intervene in some decisions to the 
extent that they could be declared as not valid, whether the economic actors have 
appealed or not. The reason is that the decisions of the NCA may affect a greater 
interest. Concerning its organizational structure, the NCA is divided into several 
layers that include three general offices, which attend 6 markets, and is led by a 
General Director appointed by the Ministry.
The transparency and accountability mechanisms in the NCA have been chan-
ging, and currently the agency publishes the most important cases, either through 
its web page or through its annual reports; on the other hand, most of the access 
to information is regulated by the laws on transparency in Norway, although the-
re are certain limits when it comes to any investigation process. Apart from that, 
in the Act there are no special accountability dispositions.
DISCUSSION IN TERMS OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The intention of this article has been to explore the institutional design of the 
regulatory agencies –particularly, those related to the promotion of competition 
in different countries– in order to extract some lessons related to the transparency 
and the accountability instruments. Among other things, this is the result of the 
possible deficits of transparency and accountability that these agencies present, 
especially when they must answer to another type of criteria as for example the 
search of the efficiency and the best performance of the markets in terms of a 
healthy competition and prohibition of monopolistic practices.
One of the most important premises upon which the article is based is that 
the different historical-institutional contexts of each one of the countries had had 
a great influence not only on the institutional design of the regulatory agencies 
of competition, but also on their functioning, performance and on their trans-
parency and account surrender mechanisms . In this sense, one of the elements 
which can be seen in the development of the IRAS set out above is that it seems 
that, on the one hand, its institutional design expresses the need of established 
agencies who need a high level of autonomy and independence, but at the same 
time there is a concern about establishing mechanisms to promote transparency 
and accountability.
In addition, one of the elements that seem to appear in the design and evo-
lution of the IRAS is that they seemed to strengthen the thesis of convergence / 
divergence. That is to say, in each of them, a certain institutional isomorphism 
is observed in so far as the institutional mechanisms of transparency are almost 
the same. These are: the publication of annual reports, a web page where they 
place their decisions, regulations and their functioning and, from a state level, all 
of them are subordinated to legislation for transparency. On the other hand, the Regulatory State and Regulatory Agencies in the Competition Sector
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reasons behind the creation of these agencies are also very similar, in the sense 
that they were born with the intention of regulating markets that were created as 
part of the implementation of the NPM.
In terms of divergent processes, it is noticeable that in Brazil the regulatory 
agency of the competition is part of a wider system where different Ministries 
intervene and with a function closer to the judicial branch, whereas in case of 
Norway it belongs to a Ministry and Directorate, although more related to the 
international arenas, while in the case of Mexico it is linked to a secretary of 
State without being part of the Secretary. Hereby, what turns out to be divergent 
is the institutional model under which this type of agencies functions and that 
can be the result of the political administrative context as well as their history 
and relations with the exterior. The above mentioned model might have diverse 
implications in terms of transparency and accountability, since on the one hand 
it influences their degree of autonomy, but on the other hand can lead to a major 
fragmentation and the danger of duplicity of functions.
Finally, whether we face the divergent or convergent thesis, what seems to 
be clear is the existence of a concern for the need to promote and to establish 
better transparency and accountability instruments, among other things, to over-
come certain democratic deficit and the legitimization of these agencies. As it was 
mentioned previously, the present article forms a part of a much larger project 
on the institutional design of regulatory agencies; therefore, it is expected that 
the current results could serve to nourish the above mentioned project, not only 
penetrating into these cases, but into other sectors such as telecommunications 
and energy. Culebro
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